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11 Introduction
Recently, social capital became a catchword to explain the unobserved heterogeneity in the economic
performance of people, communities, and countries [Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000)]. What, then, are
the individual and aggregate returns to social capital? Is it even possible to quantify these seemingly
intangible returns? On the one hand, estimating individual returns to social capital is made easier by us-
ing micro data. There are many reduced-form micro studies that found positive returns to social capital
[Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004); Fafchamps and Minten (2002); Narayan and Pritchett (1999)]. How-
ever, as Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) and Fafchamps (2006) argue, individual returns are often poor
predictors of aggregate returns. If social capital enables certain individuals or groups to capture rents at
the expense of others, then social capital becomes individually remunerative yet socially unproductive.1
Olson (1982) pointed that such examples include the formations of trade unions, political parties, and
lobbyist groups. Fafchamps (2006) referred to this situation as the fallacy of composition. In contrast, if
social capital generates positive externalities that are not entirely appropriated by the owners of social
capital, individual returns will underestimate social returns. Accordingly, private returns to social capi-
tal from micro-level social capital studies should not be considered as evidence that social capital is also
socially beneﬁcial. An important empirical question pertains to determining whether it is the fallacy of
composition problems or positive externalities that exist. In order to estimate the aggregate returns to
social capital, an independent empirical framework should be designed and implemented carefully. This
paper aims to exert such eﬀorts.
While in the existing macro-level literature, Knack and Keefer (1997), Temple and Johnson (1998),
Zak and Knack (2001), and Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) found a positive correlation between social capital
and economic growth, there is no formal eﬀort to estimate the structural parameters related to the
aggregate returns to social capital or the degree of social capital’s contribution to economic growth.
There are at least two reasons for the lack of such research. First, this may be due to the fact that
the concept of social capital has remained multi-faceted and elusive since Loury (1977) introduced it
into modern social science research and Coleman (1988) popularized it in sociology. In general, social
capital is understood as the informal forms of institutions and organizations based on social relationships,
networks and associations that create shared knowledge, mutual trust, social norms, and unwritten rules
[Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004)]. Because the concept of social capital is a bundle of these intangible
objects, it may be elusive by nature. A major challenge is to quantify intangible social capital at the
aggregate level and thereby distinguish it from other types of capital.
Second, while cross-country growth regression studies, namely, the Barro Regression [Barro (1991)],
1Social capital may facilitate collusion among group members that is not socially productive [Fafchamps and Minten
(2002)].
2have become a standard method to examine the determinants of economic growth, its reduced-form
nature is not suitable for identifying the structure of economic growth. The inﬂuential works of Knack
and Keefer (1997) and Temple and Johnson (1998) also employed a reduced-form growth regression
for the role of social capital and thus, do not consider the structural parameters that characterize the
aggregate returns to social capital. Moreover, as Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) argue, it is diﬃcult
to estimate a growth equation with an aggregate social capital variable as one of the independent
variables because such a variable is correlated with the error term by nature; nonetheless, determining
an appropriate instrumental variable is not straightforward.
We aim to bridge this gap in the existing literature by closely following the empirical strategy of
Mankiw et al. (1992) and Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996). Mankiw et al. (1992) (hereafter MRW)
extended the canonical Solow model by incorporating human capital and estimating the degree of the
contributions of both physical and human capital to economic growth. Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996)
augmented the augmented Solow model of MRW by adding R&D investment so as to enable them to
quantify a social rate of return for technological knowledge. Our basic strategy is to augment MRW’s
model by including social capital as an additional production input in order to estimate the output
elasticity of social capital. By doing so, we can quantify the aggregate returns to social capital as
compared with other types of capital.
With regard to the choice of appropriate data for social capital, we conﬁne ourselves to cosider social
capital as a source of economic development by improving the social connectivity through information
sharing and mutual communications.2 In particular, we follow Ostrom (2000) that emphasizes the im-
portance of shared knowledge when deﬁning the concept of social capital. While it is not straightforward
to quantify the total stock of social capital that is deﬁned in this manner, ﬂow investments in social
capital should be observed by newspaper readership, the frequency of exchanging letters and electronic
mails, the number of radio listeners and televiewers, and so on. We adopt some of such ﬂow data and
apply it to extend and estimate the augmented Solow model of MRW by including social capital as an
additional production input. Contrary to a standard reduced-form growth regression approach to the
role of social capital in economic growth such as that in Knack and Keefer (1997), Temple and Johnson
(1998), Helliwell and Putnam (1995), Zak and Knack (2001), and Beugelsdijk et al. (2004), our strategy
enables us to estimate the structural parameters associated with aggregate returns to social capital.
To preview our results, there are two important ﬁndings that emerge from our empirical analysis.
First, the output elasticity of social capital is estimated to be approximately 0.10. While social capital
positively aﬀects economic growth, the magnitude of the eﬀect is smaller than that of physical and human
2Through a comprehensive survey on social capital covering both micro and macro literature, Durlauf and Fafchamps
(2004) concluded that mutual communication is one of the most important common components of the diﬀerent deﬁnitions
of social capital.
3capital as well as labor inputs. In particular, the aggregated returns to social capital appear to be almost
negligible for OECD countries. Yet, the returns are much higher for developing countries, suggesting that
the aggregate eﬀect of social capital is systematically related with the level of development. Second, the
depreciation rate of social capital is estimated to be approximately 10% per annum and is considerably
higher than that of physical capital. This may be due to the fact that social capital is intangible and is
thus easily eroded by nature unless continuous investment eﬀorts are made.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we brieﬂy describe the
procedure to augment the augmented Solow model of MRW. Section 3 explains the data and our choice
of variables in order to quantify the concept of social capital. In Section 4, we show our empirical
results of the augmented augmented-Solow model. First, we present our main results with the new
social capital variables. Second, we consider the relationship between our estimates and those from the
existing studies on the role of social capital in economic growth. We then perform a robustness check
of our empirical results. In the ﬁnal section, we will touch upon the direction of the future research.
2 The Augmented Augmented-Solow Model
2.1 Derivation of the Level Equation
We extend MRW by considering three types of capital input, i.e., physical capital, human capital,
and social capital, which are denoted by Ki(t),i = k,h,s, respectively, in addition to labor input,
L(t) and labor-augmenting technology level, A(t).3 We assume the following constant-returns-to-scale
Cobb-Douglas production function with the share parameters for physical, human, and social capitals,
represented by α,β, and γ, respectively:





where we impose the assumptions that α,β,γ ∈ [0,1) and α + β + γ ∈ [0,1). Following MRW, we
postulate that the law of motion for each capital is a common across the country, with the depreciation
rate for the i-th capital being δi. The rate of the labor augmenting technological progress is denoted by
g, with the initial technology level, A(0), which follows an internationally common distribution. The
population growth rate is n and the time-invariant country-speciﬁc saving rates for each type of capital
are represented by si,i = k,h,s. Deﬁne eﬃciency labor unit values as ˜ y = Y/AL and ˜ ki = Ki/AL.
3Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996) develops an augmented version of the augmented-Solow model incorporating R&D
investment. Our model replaces the R&D in their model to social capital. The model can be also regarded as a special
case of Bajo-Rubio (2000).
4Then, under this environment, we can derive Solow’s basic equation in eﬃciency labor unit:
˙ ˜ ki = si˜ y − (n + g + δi)˜ ki, (2)
where i = k,h,s. In the steady state, ˙ ˜ ki = 0; thus, it is straightforward to show that steady state per
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Suppose that the depreciation rate is the same for all the types of capital, ∀ i δi = δ, and that lnA(t) =
lnA(0)+gt with lnA(0) = a+ε, where ε ∼ N(0,σ2
ε). Then, the log per capita income can be represented
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This equation is a straightforward extension of MRW’s level regression equation. This equation implies
that if each country is in the steady state in year t, then the log per capita income can be expressed as a
log linear function of the saving rates for the three types of capital inputs, population growth rate plus
g +δ,4 and a constant term, a+gt, as well as a random error term ε. Following MRW, we estimate the
level equation (4) in the following two ways. First, we estimate the unrestricted model by regressing
log per capita income on the three saving rates and other variables on the right-hand side. Second, we
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Then, we employed the delta method to estimate the factor share parameters and their standard errors.
2.2 Derivation of the Conditional Convergence Equation
Following MRW, we can also derive a growth equation on the transition path toward the steady state:
ln ˜ y(t) − ln ˜ y(0) = θ[ln ˜ y∗ − ln ˜ y(0)], (6)
4We follow MRW and assume that n + δ = 0.05
5where θ ≡ 1 −e−(n+g+δ)(1−α−β−γ)t.5 By substituting for ˜ y∗ by (3) and using the condition y = ˜ yA, we




= aθ + gt + θ
α
1 − α − β − γ
ln(sk) + θ
β




1 − α − β − γ
ln(ss) − θ
α + β + γ
1 − α − β − γ
ln(n + g + δ) − θlny(0) + θε. (7)
The equation implies that under all the maintained assumptions, per capita income growth is explained
by the determinants of the steady state income as well as the initial income level. In equation (7), λ
is the parameter representing the speed of convergence. By using equation (4) or (7), we can explicitly
estimate the factor share of the three capital stocks.
3 Data
In order to construct the data set exclduing social capital, we followed the data compilation procedure of
MRW and Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak (2002) whereby the MRW model is re-estimated by using updated
data until the year 1995. We employed the data set of Mankiw et al. (1992) that is available in Greory
Mankiw’s web page6 and that of Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak (2002) that is available in Ben Bernanke’s
web page7 and further extended the data set up to the year 2000 by using the Penn World Tables (PWT)
Mark 6.1. The other data sets that we employed include: World Development Indicators (WDI)[World
Bank (2003)], World Population Prospects [United Nations Population Division (2005)]. The data
appendix explains the details of the data sources and provides a description of the variables employed
in this paper.8
3.1 Indicators of social capital
In this subsection, we explain our strategy to construct proxy variables for social capital. Durlauf and
Fafchamps (2004) provides a comprehensive survey on an empirical strategy to quantify social capital,
both in the micro and macro contexts. In particular, we require data on the saving rate of social
capital accumulation in our augmented MRW model. However, the concept of social capital remains
elusive; moreover, nearly all existing studies do not distinguish social capital stock from social capital
investments. MRW argues that, in general, when we estimate a variant of the augmented Solow model,
a primary question is whether the available data on capital correspond more closely to the stock level
5The procedure to derive equation (6) is available from the corresponding author upon request.
6http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mankiw/data/contr1.pdf
7http://www.princeton.edu/ bernanke/bernankegurkaynak.zip
8The data set employed in this paper, which includes social capital, is available at CIRJE, Faculty of Economics,
University of Tokyo (http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/dp/2006/list.htm).
6of capital or to its saving rate. Since the theory requires the employment of the latter, we carefully
elaborate a proxy variable for the saving rate of social capital.9
In the literature, there are two widely used macro variables of social capital. The ﬁrst variable is
called “Trust” and was complied by Knack and Keefer (1997) based on data from the World Values
Surveys [World Values Study Group (1999); Inglehart, Ronald, et al. (2003); European Values Study
Group and World Values Survey Association (2005)]. This variable is constructed from the survey result
of the question, “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t
be too careful in dealing with people?” Trust is the percentage of respondents in each nation replying
“most people can be trusted” after deleting the “don’t know” response [Knack and Keefer (1997)]. The
question is intended to assess the current situation with respect to Trust and therefore, this variable
appears to capture the stock of social capital.
The other variable is the social development indicator, SOCDEV, employed by Temple and Johnson
(1998). This variable is a famous index of socioeconomic development and was originally constructed by
Adelman and Morris (1967). The Adelman-Morris index is constructed by applying factor analysis to
41 social, political, and economic indicators for 74 developing countries for the period 1957–62. While
the index is a complicated composite of various observables, Temple and Johnson (1998) concluded
that the variable COMMS is a good proxy for the strength of civic communities as reﬂected in trust
and membership. As one of the ﬁve most important indicators of the SOCDEV variable, COMMS is
composed of a weighted average of the number of radios per head and the rate of newspaper circulation
[Temple and Johnson (1998)]. In the COMMS variable, since a radios is a durable good, the number of
radios is supposed to be a stock variable. On the other hand, newspaper circulation is a ﬂow variable.
This variable captures people’s saving and investments in shared knowledge—an important aspect of
social capital, as pointed out by Ostrom (2000). Hence, it will not be unreasonable to adopt this
variable as a proxy of the saving rate of social capital. Accordingly, we adopt the NEWS variable,
which is deﬁned as the number of daily newspapers circulated per 1,000 people, as a proxy variable
for the saving rate of social capital. The data is extracted from WDI of the World Bank [World Bank
(2003)].
Other important investments in shared knowledge as social capital should be in the form of exchang-
ing letters. Therefore, we will also consider the POSTAL variable that is deﬁned as the average number
of letter-post items posted per inhabitant, divided by 1000. The data is taken from Universal Postal
9For example, in the case of physical capital, the stock of the capital is measured by capital stock in national accounts.
The ﬂow of physical capital is capital formation and the saving rate is captured by, for example, the net national saving
rate. In the case of human capital, the Barro-Lee index of the average schooling level of the working age population is
used widely in growth regression and is regarded as a stock measure of human capital (Barro and Lee (2000)). The ﬂow of
human capital is rarely considered, whereas MRW quantiﬁed the saving rate of human capital in terms of the percentage
of the working age population in secondary school, i.e., Secondary enrollment ratio × (Population aged 15–19 / Population
aged 15–64).
7Union (2005).
Another justiﬁcation for the use of the NEWS and POSTAL variables comes from data availability.
These two variables are easily available for a larger set of countries and for a longer time period than
the Trust and SOCDEV variables. As Zak and Knack (2001) pointed out, the result of Knack and
Keefer (1997) may suﬀer from a sample selection bias because the data of Knack and Keefer (1997)
comes mainly from OECD countries. However, we may eﬀectively mitigate this problem by using the
NEWS and POSTAL variables that are widely available in the cross-section of countries.
4 Estimation Results
This section presents the empirical results and is composed of six subsections. First, we represent the
MRW replication results with updated data. Second, we present our main result of the estimation of the
augmented augmented-Solow model. Third, we compare our estimation and the existing reduced-form
estimations. Fourth, we estimate the depreciation rate of social capital and thereby test a hypothesis of
the full depreciation. Fifth, we re-estimate the model using the instrumental variable method in order
to determine and mitigate possible endogeneity problems. Finally, a set of robustness analyses will be
conducted.
4.1 The MRW Speciﬁcations for 1960–1985
First, we replicate the MRW model by using the original PWT 4.0 data, the PTW 6.0 data used
by Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak (2002), and new data based on PTW 6.1 for the period from 1960 to
1985. Thus, we check the properties and comparability of the new data set. Tables 1 and 2 show the
results for the level and growth regressions, respectively, both of which are based on the original MRW
speciﬁcation. The estimation results of the new data have several notable features. First, the model
restriction is rejected for the level regression with the full sample, which is similar to the results obtained
by Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak (2002). In the same speciﬁcation, the capital share is smaller while the
human capital share is the larger than that in the results of MRW and Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak (2002).
Second, with regard to the growth regression with the full sample, while the model restriction cannot
be rejected, the share parameters have the same property as the level regression.
4.2 The Augmented Augmented-Solow model
We now turn to updated data set that spans over 1960–2000. Columns 1 through 6 in Table 3 show
the revised version of MRW and Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak (2002). These results are similar to the
8results obtained by MRW and Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak (2002). First, while the ﬁt of the model is
favorable for the Non-Oil and the Intermediate samples, the OECD sample contains a signiﬁcant part
that remains unexplained. Second, the original Solow speciﬁcation yields an implausibly large value of
α. On the other hand, for human capital, H, the estimated α and β are approximately 0.25 and 0.3,
respectively. Third, the p-values of the model restriction are small, as pointed out by Bernanke and
G¨ urkaynak (2002), thus rejecting the model restrictions.
In Table 3, columns 10–12 show our main results of the level equation (4) of the augmented
augmented-Solow model with the NEWS variable as an additional independent variable. The model ﬁt
improves uniformly. According to the results with the full sample, the adjusted R2 improved to 0.81
from 0.78 in the augmented Solow model of MRW. The p-values for the model restrictions are still small,
but for the sample of intermediate countries, the restriction cannot be rejected.
More importantly, the estimated output elasticity with respect to social capital, γ, is 0.10 and is
statistically signiﬁcant. This result indicates that social capital aﬀects economic growth positively and
signiﬁcantly, although the magnitude is smaller than that of the eﬀect of physical and human capital.
The estimated share parameters α and β with the full sample are 0.19 and 0.23, respectively, which are
smaller than the estimated parameters based on the augmented Solow model. However, it is not easy
to derive a plausible value for each share parameter a priori. The conventional value of physical capital
share is approximately 0.33, but it is usually calculated under the assumption of a standard production
function including neither human nor social capital. MRW found that the share parameter associated
with human capital is within the range of 0.23 and 0.33.10 Further, it is diﬃcult to derive a plausible
range for the share of social capital because social capital does not necessarily create positive eﬀects
on economic growth; as Olson (1982) pointed out, social capital can generate individually remunerative
but socially unproductive eﬀects through the formations of trade unions, political parties, and lobbyist
groups.11 Social capital may simply facilitate collusive behavior among group members [Fafchamps and
Minten (2002)]. Moreover, the gains made by those with social capital lead to losses for those without,
thus creating a fallacy of composition at the aggregate level [Fafchamps (2006)]. Accordingly, it would
be reasonable to observe that the share of social capital is not large.
The ﬁnal three columns of Table 4 summarize the estimation results of growth equation (7) of the
augmented augmented-Solow model with the NEWS variable. First, the model ﬁt improves uniformly
again if we compare the results with the augmented Solow model of MRW. With regard to the estimated
share parameters, α is approximately 0.33 and β falls into the range of 0.14 and 0.23. The γ parameter
10If we follow the logic of MRW, in our augmented augmented-Solow model, the shares of physical and human capital
would also be lower than those estimated by MRW.
11Moreover, while the production of social capital may require tangible inputs such as physical capital and labor, there
will be no real compensations for social capital per se.
9is around 0.07–0.09 and is marginally signiﬁcant. The rate of convergence, λ, is comparable to the rate
obtained by the augmented Solow model of MRW. Finally, the model restrictions cannot be rejected in
all speciﬁcations, supporting the validity of the augmented augmented-Solow model.
Tables 5 and 6 show the estimation results of the level and growth equations, respectively, of the
augmented augmented-Solow model by using the POSTAL variable as a variable for the social capital
saving rate. The qualitative results are surprisingly similar to those obtained using the NEWS variable.
In the case of the full and intermediate income countries, the estimated γ falls into the range between
0.09 and 0.11 and there is a gain in terms of the model ﬁt from using the augmented augmented-Solow
model.
The overall estimation results of the augmented augmented-Solow model suggest that the inclusion
of social capital as an additional production input generates improvements in the ﬁt of the Solow model.
Moreover, the extended model appears to generate reasonable estimates because the implied values of
structural parameters fall into the plausible range of 0.07–0.11.
4.3 The Reduced-form Growth Regression Model vs. the Augmented
Augmented-Solow Model
In this subsection, we will explicitly compare the reduced-form growth regression approach by Knack
and Keefer (1997) and Temple and Johnson (1998) with our augmented augmented-Solow model. While
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Temple and Johnson (1998) took a standard approach in incorporating
social capital into the Barro regression as one of the independent variables, this approach cannot allow us
to make inferences on the relative contribution of social capital. Moreover, as is evident from equations
(4) and (7), it is diﬃcult to justify the use of the stock value of, instead of the saving rate of social
capital. However, one way to justify the use of the stock variable is to suppose that the level of social
capital is constant over time. This implies that the saving rate of social capital always corresponds
with the depreciation rate of social capital, i.e., a product of the exogenously given depreciation rate
and the level of social capital stock. However, such a situation is not always warranted. Moreover, this
assumption will undermine the entire logic of social capital accumulation.
Nevertheless, it may still be meaningful to consider the possible linkages between the reduced-form
approach with a social capital stock variable and our augmented augmented-Solow model. We will argue
that there are at least two ways to justify the inclusion of the stock of social capital rather than the
saving rate of social capital in equations (4) and (7).12 First, we can work on a speciﬁcation with the
steady state condition. Second, we can assume the full depreciation of social capital.
12In other words, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Temple and Johnson (1998) are regarded as special cases of the augmented
augmented-Solow model.
10First, in the steady state, we can rewrite the level regression equation (3) in order to replace the
saving rate of social capital with its stock variable. Since ˙ ˜ ks = 0 in the steady state, from Solow’s basic
equation (2) for social capital, we have ss = (n + g + δs)˜ ks/˜ y. By combining this with equation (3), we
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The above equation (9) justiﬁes the inclusion of the stock of social capital as an independent variable,
suggesting the validity of Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001). Since we should employ
the steady state level of social capital stock (ks), we extract the Trust variable at the latest possible
period and add it as an additional independent variable in the level and growth regression equations.
First, three columns of Table 7 show the estimation results of the growth equation (9) by including
the latest Trust variable as an independent variable.14 The implied level of the elasticity γ with the
non-oil countries sample is 0.04, which is implausibly small. Moreover, this parameter is statistically
insigniﬁcant. However, this result may suﬀer from an endogeneity bias, and thus, it would be more
plausible to employ social capital data for the earliest period possible. This is replicated in the following
second case.
The second way to justify the use of social capital stock in the regression equation is to assume
the full depreciation of social capital, i.e., δs = 1. Under the assumption of the full depreciation of
social capital, we can show that the growth regression model becomes one, with the initial social capital
on the right-hand side; this is identical to that shown in Knack and Keefer (1997) and Temple and
Johnson (1998). Note that the assumption that δs = 1 implies that ssY (t) = Ks(t) ∀t. Hence, it is
straightforward to show that ss = (1 + n + g)ks(t)/y(t) ∀t. Combining this expression with the growth
13This type of equation is derived by MRW in their equation (12) for the case of human capital. It is also straightforward
to derive a corresponding growth equation [Islam (1995), equation (18)]
14On the other hand, the SOCDEV variable is available only for the period around 1960.
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In this case, the equation includes the initial value of the stock of social capital. The resulting
regression equation (10) is almost identical to the equations employed by Knack and Keefer (1997)
and Temple and Johnson (1998). One would argue that the full depreciation assumption is critical for
linking a standard reduced-form growth model to the augmented augmented-Solow model. Apart from
the issue of assuming that δs = 1, which will be investigated later, we estimated the regression equation
(10) by using the initial level of the social capital variables adopted by Knack and Keefer (1997) and
Temple and Johnson (1998), i.e., Trust and SOCDEV, respectively.
Table 7 shows the estimation results with the full sample including the initial level of social capital15.
With the entire non-oil countries sample, the initial Trust variable yields the implied level of the elasticity
γ being 0.10, which is consistent with the previous estimates. On the other hand, the results with
including the SOCDEV variable yield the estimated elasticity to be approximately 0.2, which may
necessitate further investigations.
In sum, we may say that, in general, we obtain supporting estimates of the structural parameters
consistent with the speciﬁcation of Knack and Keefer (1997). Yet, the results with the speciﬁcation of
Temple and Johnson (1998) are not necessarily comparable to the previous structural parameters.16
4.4 A Test of Full Depreciation
In the last subsection, we showed that by imposing an assumption of the full depreciation of social capital,
we obtain an almost identical estimation model to the models postulated by Knack and Keefer (1997)
and Temple and Johnson (1998). In order to verify the validity of the full depreciation assumption,
in this subsection, we will show the procedure and results to estimate the depreciation rate for social
capital.
Suppose that δk = δh = δ and δs  = δ. Then, the growth regression equation (7) can be rewritten as
15Since SOCDEV takes negative values in some countries, we treat SOCDEV as the log of the stock of social capital.
One of the regression equations run by Temple and Johnson (1998) has exactly the same form as this growth regression,
although they regard SOCDEV as a Total Factor Productivity (TFP) shifter.
16A possible reason for the similarities of the results for the stock variable, Trust, and the saving rate variable is a high
correlation among these variables. The correlation coeﬃcient of the saving rate variable, NEWS, with the stock variables,
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where φi are the coeﬃcients to be estimated. The important coeﬃcient of our interest is φ6 because the
model implies φ6 = g + δs, including the depreciation rate for social capital. Yet, this parameter also
involves the technological growth rate, g, due to which we cannot directly estimate the exact value of
δs. Fortunately, g is considered to be small. According to the reliable estimates of Young (1995) and
Hsieh (2002) for the high-performing East Asian countries as well as developed countries, g should be
less than 2%. Hence, we can still obtain the lower bound of the depreciation rate.
The estimation results of equation (12) that are obtained by using nonlinear least squares are pre-
sented in Table 8. The estimated results of the basic parameters are similar to those under the simpliﬁed
estimation of equation (7), comparing the results reported in Table 8 with the results in columns 13–15
of Table 4. The estimated value of δs+g is approximately 12%, and the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁ-
cant. Accordingly, it would be reasonable to consider that the lower-bound estimate of the depreciation
rate of social capital is approximately 10% per annum.
By testing the null hypothesis that ˆ φ6=1, we completely reject the hypothesis that δs+g = 1. Hence,
the model of the full depreciation of social capital is rejected by the data set.17 It is also true that the
estimated depreciation rate of social capital, i.e., 10%, is much higher than that of physical capital,
which is supposed to be approximately 3–5% [Romer (1989) and Nadiri and Prucha (1996)].
The result may suggest that unlike physical capital, continuous investments will be necessary in
order to maintain a certain level of social capital for a long period. This may be due to the fact that
social capital is intangible and is thus easily eroded by nature unless continuous investment eﬀorts are
made.
17However, it also rejects the assumption of MRW, i.e., δi + g = 0.05, which has also been employed in our previous
estimates. Hence, the common depreciation assumption of MRW may generate biased results despite its greater tractability.
134.5 Aggregate Returns to Social Capital
As shown in equation (8) of Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996), we can compute the steady state social
rate of return using the estimated output elasticities and other observable data. The social returns to
or the marginal productivity of social capital, the net depreciation of capital, can be expressed as
∂Y
∂Ki
− δi = σi ∗
n + g + δi
si
− δi, (13)
where σi = α,β, and γ. Based on the estimation in the previous subsection, the depreciation rate of
social capital is approximately 10% per annum. We follow Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996) and assume
that the depreciation rates for physical and human capital are both 3%.
It is now straightforward to calculate the social return to capital by using the elasticity estimated
by (13). Table 9 presents the calculated social return to capital for Non-Oil, Intermediate, and OECD
countries. We report the median values across countries in order to remove the eﬀects of outliers. The
ﬁrst row represents the aggregate returns to social capital based on the NEWS variable. They indicate
that the social rates of return are 9.77%, 2.03%, and –7.60% for Non-Oil, Intermediate, and OECD
countries, respectively, which are smaller than those to physical and human capital. Moreover, the values
for OECD countries is negative, suggesting the seriousness of the fallacy of composition hypothesized
by Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) and Fafchamps (2006) in the case of developed countries.18
4.6 Endogeneity Bias
A common serious concern with regard to the cross-country growth regressions is the possibility of an
endogeneity bias. When we take the Solow model as it is, all the independent variables are treated
as exogenous variables by construction. However, in terms of econometric modeling, it is diﬃcult to
justify that all variables are exogenously determined. For example, social capital is more likely to be
created when income is higher, suggesting a reversed causality [Fafchamps (2006)]. In order to avoid the
endogeneity problem, it is desirable to treat at least the saving rate of social capital as an endogenous
variable. However, the diﬃculties in identifying social capital eﬀects from aggregate data are possibly
greater than from individual-level data [Durlauf (2002)]. In speciﬁc terms, in the aggregate data, one no
longer has access to instrumental variables based on the averaging of individual-level variables [Durlauf
and Fafchamps (2004)]. Determining a set of appropriate instrumental variables that aﬀect social capital
but do not aﬀect the aggregate output is a challenge. First, all values in 1960 are used as instruments
since they are predetermined in the regression during 1960–2000. Second, we add the area of each
18The results based on the POSTAL variable reveal considerably higher returns in developing countries. One possible
reason for this is that saving rates based on POSTAL are unreasonably low in low-income countries.
14country (in log form) as an additional instrumental variable; as compared with a large-area country,
people living in a small country may ﬁnd it easier to communicate among themselves without relying on
postal services and mass media. Third, we follow an approach elaborated by Cook (2002) who proposes
to use the damages of capital stock caused by World War II as instruments because such damages can
be regarded as predetermined exogenous variables. Yet, the instruments employed by Cook (2002) are
not available for most of the Asian and African countries. Hence, a cost of using the third approach is
the reduction of the sample size that may possibly induce a sample selection bias.
Our estimation method is the eﬃcient two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation,
which provides heteroskedasticity consistent estimators. The result is shown in Tables 10 and 11. Since
the OECD sample size individually is limited, the tables contain results with the entire sample only.
We show the restricted models in order to save space. As regards the level regression, the estimated
social capital elasticities, γ, falls in the ranges of 0.11–0.21 and 0.01–0.18 with the NEWS and POSTAL
variables, respectively. With regard to the growth regressions, the estimated parameter falls in the ranges
of 0.05–0.12 and 0.05–0.18 with the NEWS and POSTAL variables, respectively. These estimation
results suggest the possibility of endogeneity bias. In fact, we cannot reject all the overidentiﬁcation
tests, thus supporting the validity of our instruments. However, if we include n + g + δ, sk, as well
as sh or ss for our instruments, the estimated γ is close to that of the OLS estimates (the last three
columns of Tables 10 and 11.19 Accordingly, the test results may, after all, also justify the reliability of
the results based on OLS.
4.7 Robustness
In this section, we will further examine the robustness of our estimation results of the augmented
augmented-Solow model. While there is no one-ﬁt-all procedure of the robustness analysis, we conduct
four analyses to check the robustness. First, we employ an alternative set of variables for social capital.
Second, we follow the argument of Islam (1995) and utilize a panel estimation method in order to control
for a possible omitted variable bias as well as endogeneity bias. Thirdly, we employ the test procedure
of Temple (1998) to check the robustness by carefully eliminating outliers. Finally, following Hoeﬄer
(2002), the dependent variable of the growth rate of GDP per worker is replaced by that of GDP per
capita.
First, we simultaneously employ the NEWS and POSTAL variables because these variables do not
necessarily capture the same dimension of social capital. While the former is likely to track the degree
of impersonal public information sharing, the latter captures private knowledge sharing. The estimation
results reported in Table 12 suggest that peer-to-peer information sharing appears to be more important
19Note that in these cases, the estimated value of γ falls in the range of 0.04–0.11.
15to facilitate aggregate production than public knowledge sharing, which may be suﬃciently achived in
advance, particularly in developed countries.
Following Knack and Keefer (1997), we utilize the GROUPS variable as a proxy for the saving rate
of social capital that is deﬁned as the average number of groups cited per respondent in each country.
The groups include: a) social welfare services for elderly, handicapped, or deprived people; b) religious
or church organizations; c) education, arts, music, or cultural activities; d) trade unions; e) political
parties or groups; f) local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality;
g) third world development or human rights; h) conservation, the environment, ecology; i) professional
associations; j) youth work, e.g., scouts, guides, youth clubs, etc. Closely following Knack and Keefer
(1997), we further divide the group variable into two main group variables, i.e., “Putnam-esque” and
“Olsonian” groups [Putnam et al. (1993); Olson (1982)]. Groups b, c, and j from the above list were
identiﬁed as the “Putnam-esque” group, while groups d, e, and i were groups with redistributive goals
and were called the “Olsonian” group. Hereafter, we refer to the former and latter groups as P-GROUPS
and O-GROUPS, respectively.
Basically, the notion of GROUP captures how often people spend time on non-working activities and
participate in group activities. Through such activities, people are expected to build intangible trust,
kinship, and/or norms. However, participation in groups will involve opportunity costs to the people.
Considering these costs as people’s investments in social capital formation, we can regard the GROUP
variables as the measure of the saving rates of social capital.
In Tables 13 and 14, we show the estimation result by using the GROUP variables. With the P-
GROUPS and O-GROUPS variables, the estimated level of γ is much smaller than the results by using
NEWS or POSTAL and are statistically insigniﬁcant in general. These weak results are consistent with
Knack and Keefer (1997) who attended to distinguish the two types of groups and obtained statistically
elusive results. We may attribute these results to an attenuation bias due to measurement errors.
GROUP variables are based only on whether or not a respondent belongs a group, and they completely
disregard the intensity of participation. Further, the results may be plagued by a small sample bias
because the GROUP variable is available mainly for OECD only. As is widely recognized, MRW’s
augmented Solow model for OECD countries generates unreasonable results [Nonneman and Vanhoudt
(1996)].
Second, the assumption of an internationally common initial productivity level may be too restrictive.
Rather, saving and fertility behavior should be aﬀected by productivity level or vice versa. In other
words, MRW tests the joint hypothesis of the validity of the Solow model and the assumption of a well-
behaved error term [Islam (1995)]. As Islam (1995) clearly explains, a panel data framework provides a
16better and more natural setting to control for the endogeneity bias arising from the correlation between
the error term and the explanatory variables. Moreover, the panel approach will mitigate a potential
omitted variable bias. In our estimations, we work with the ﬁrst diﬀerence method by dividing the
whole period into a ﬁrst and second period, i.e., 1960–80 and 1980–2000. Since the POSTAL variable is
not available as a panel data, we only employed the NEWS variable for the saving rate of social capital.
Tables 15 and 16 summarize the panel estimation results of the level and growth equations, respectively.
The estimated parameter, γ, is much smaller than the estimates by using cross-sectional data in Tables
3 and 4 and is largely statistically insigniﬁcant. Moreover, the model restrictions are rejected for the
most part, particularly for the level regression. Such rather weak evidence may be a manifestation of
the seriousness of the fallacy of composition. Alternatively, it can simply be attributed to the lack of
reliable panel data to estimate the augmented augmented-Solow model because data on saving rates for
human and social capital are diﬃcult to obtain for each year throughout the period.
Third, we examine the robustness by eliminating outliers using a procedure developed by Temple
(1998). First, before checking for outliers, we follow Temple (1998) and included regional dummy
variables. Thus, we may be able to control for the diﬀerence of the initial technology level. Next, in
order to identify outliers, we employ the method of least trimmed squares, which has been proposed by
Rousseeuw (1984) and Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987). Then, after eliminating the identiﬁed outliers that
are listed in Table 5, we estimate the models using only in-sample observations20. This procedure is
regarded as a simpliﬁed version of the reweighted least squares (RWLS).
The results are reported in Table 17. In order to simplify our presentation, we report the results
of only unrestricted regressions while we also show the implied values of structural parameters and p-
values for the test of the model restriction. Columns 1–3 and 7–9 show the results with regional dummies
whereas columns 4–6 and 10–12 are based on the RWLS procedure. Even after adding regional dummies,
we obtain results comparable to the case without the dummy variables, although the contribution of
physical capital is reduced signiﬁcantly. With regard to the RWLS procedure, while the level regression
results are comparable as before, the growth regression gives smaller estimates for γ.
Finally, following Hoeﬄer (2002)’s recommendation, GDP per capita is replaced as a dependent
variable. In this paper, we use the level or growth of GDP per worker as a dependent variable in order
to maintain comparability with MRW. The use of GDP per worker may suﬀer from an endogenous
change in the structure of labor supply [Hoeﬄer (2002)]. However, as shown in Tables 19 and 20, we
ﬁnd basically the same qualitative results as in the case of our main regressions.
20In order to mitigate computational burden, we modiﬁed the method slightly. Once outliers are identiﬁed, all of them
are excluded from the second-stage sample.
175 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we constructed and implemented an empirical model to uncover the aggregate output
elasticity of social capital, which characterizes the aggregate returns to social capital, by augmenting
the augmented-Solow model of MRW. Considering the recent developments of empirical studies on social
capital, we believe that we take one step forward in quantifying the role of social capital in comparison
with other production inputs. Our empirical results reveal that while social capital contributes to eco-
nomic growth signiﬁcantly, the upper bound of the elasticity of social capital to output is approximately
0.10 and is signiﬁcantly smaller than that of physical and human capital. This small but signiﬁcantly
positive eﬀect of social capital in economic growth is moderately robust in the choice of the variable for
social capital, in choice of the sample, and even after eliminating possible outliers. As a by product, our
estimation results show that the depreciation rate of social capital is approximately 10% per annum,
which is signiﬁcantly higher than that of physical capital.
The cross-country medians of the aggregate returns to social capital based on the NEWS variable
are 9.77%, 2.03%, and –7.60% for Non-Oil, Intermediate, and OECD countries, respectively. These
returns are smaller than the returns to physical and human capital. In particular, the value for OECD
countries is negative and much smaller if we compare it with the results of micro studies on social
capital. Our results support a view that the measurement of social capital involves a serious fallacy of
composition—arising from collusive behavior among group members—rather than positive externalities
[Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) and Fafchamps (2006)].
However, the problem may persist in measuring the saving rate of social capital. By nature, quanti-
fying social capital is diﬃcult. Nevertheless, it will be rewarding to look for more appropriate variables
and estimate parameters by using them in the future studies. Thus, this paper should be regarded as a
starting point of the structural approaches estimating the eﬀect of social capital on economic growth.
Our analysis also highlights the importance of designing an appropriate empirical strategy of growth
models. Since researchers and policy makers are usually interested in structural parameters, we super-
impose a simple structural model upon data to estimate such parameters. We carefully consider the
diﬀerences among stock, ﬂow, and exogenous variables as well as saving rate in estimating structural
parameters. Undoubtedly, structural approaches have their inherent cost—it is not easy to test the
validity of theoretical structure per se. In our context, we employed a variant of the Solow model that
imposes an important assumption that the saving rates are exogenously given. Moreover, we postu-
late a constant coeﬃcient linear regression model, assuming a common socio-economic structure across
countries. Since a number of studies have found recently evidence of multiple regimes in cross-country
data, this assumption may be too restrictive [Durlauf (2002)]. Accordingly, these assumptions should
18be relaxed in future research.
Finally, besides social capital, which was our focus, other variables can be considered as important
production inputs that generate economic growth. Our framework is easily extended to estimate the
structural parameters of other variables in the context of growth models. Such extensions may be
carefully investigated in future studies.
19Data Appendix
Data Sources
Data is taken from 5 cross-country data sets:
• Penn World Table Mark 6.1 (PWT) [Heston et al. (2002)]
• World Development Indicators (WDI) [World Bank (2003)]
• World Population Prospects (WPP) [United Nations Population Division (2005)]
• World Values Survey (WVS) [World Values Study Group (1999), Inglehart, Ronald, et al. (2003)
and European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association (2005)]
• Postal Statistics [Universal Postal Union (2005)]
We also use the data set of Mankiw et al. (1992) that is available in Gregory Mankiw’s web page21
and that of Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak (2002) that is available in Ben Bernanke’s web page22. Variables
denoted as “Cook’s WW II” are taken from Cook (2002).
Variable construction
Each variable is set as follows. Note that except for case of the saving rate of social capital, we basically
reproduce the strategy of Mankiw et al. (1992) and/or Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak (2002).
• y (= Y/L): Constant price GDP per capita times working age population ratio. GDP per capita
is taken from PWT, and the working age population rate, from WDI.
• n: Working age population growth rate, calculated from WDI’s working age population data.
• g + δ: Set 0.05 following MRW.
• sk (= I/Y ): The average share of real investment (including government investment) in real GDP.
This is taken from PWT. sk in 1960 is used as one of instruments.
• sh (School): Secondary enrollment ratio × (Population aged 15–19 / Population aged 15–64).
These population rates are taken from WPP. Secondary enrollment ratio is from WDI.
• ss: The main results use daily newspaper circulation (NEWS) from WDI. We take the average of
each 5 year from 1975 to 1995 because the data set includes sets of 5 years begining from 1975.
For 2000, the collected counries are limited and the growing presence of information technology
probably leads to a fall in the importance of newspapers; thus we delete 2000. POSTAL is the
average number of letter-post items posted per inhabitant, divided by 1000. The data is from
Postal Statistics. Since the data accumulates annually after 1980, we take the annual average
from 1980 to 2000. GROUP and its subcategories are calculated from WVS. The deﬁnitions of
GROUP, O-GROUP and P-GROUP are those of Knack and Keefer (1997). GROUP is divided
by 10 and the others, by 3, the total number of the category in each index. Note that the division
(by 1000, 10, 3) is perfectly arbitrary because of the log-linear form of the estimation models.
• Trust (earliest possible data): Trust measure is taken from WVS. If more than two data is available
for a country, we choose the measure for the earliest period possible. This is the method followed
in Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001), and Beugelsdijk et al. (2004).
• Trust (latest possible data): Trust measure is taken from WVS. The only diﬀerence is choosing
the index from the latest available data.
• SOCDEV: This was drawn from Adelman and Morris (1967), p.170. It is exactly the same index
used by Temple and Johnson (1998).
21http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mankiw/data/contr1.pdf
22http://www.princeton.edu/ bernanke/bernankegurkaynak.zip
20• Barro-Lee: Average years of schooling for the working age population corresponding to the years
in Barro and Lee (2000).
• Area: The country’s area in 1995, taken from WDI.
• Price of consumption (/investment) goods in 1960: This was taken from PWT.
• Cook’s WW II: These are indices related to damages on capital stock because of World War II
and were constructed in Cook (2002)
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24Table 1: Level Regressions for 1960–1985: MRW speciﬁcation
PWT 4.0 (by MRW) PWT 6.0 (by BG) PWT 6.1
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 98 75 22 90 72 21 99 76 23
constant 6.84 7.79 8.64 6.71 8.38 10.29 6.83 7.81 11.75
(1.18) (1.19) (2.21) (1.09) (1.12) (1.93) (1.14) (1.21) (1.73)
lnsk 0.70 0.70 0.28 0.42 0.51 -0.01 0.38 0.53 0.56
(0.13) (0.15) (0.39) (0.10) (0.11) (0.30) (0.10) (0.12) (0.25)
lnsh 0.65 0.73 0.77 0.56 0.71 1.01 0.65 0.72 0.66
(0.07) (0.10) (0.29) (0.08) (0.09) (0.27) (0.07) (0.10) (0.23)
ln(n + g + δ) -1.75 -1.50 -1.08 -1.82 -1.42 -0.78 -1.83 -1.64 -0.27
(0.42) (0.40) (0.76) (0.39) (0.38) (0.61) (0.41) (0.41) (0.55)
R2 0.79 0.78 0.35 0.76 0.78 0.51 0.74 0.75 0.52
¯ R2 0.78 0.77 0.24 0.76 0.77 0.42 0.74 0.74 0.44
s.e.e. 0.51 0.45 0.32 0.47 0.43 0.26 0.52 0.48 0.24
Restricted Reg
constant 7.85 7.97 8.72 8.91 8.89 9.73 8.89 8.82 9.37
(0.14) (0.15) (0.47) (0.10) (0.11) (0.29) (0.11) (0.12) (0.26)
ln sk
n+g+δ 0.78 0.71 0.28 0.46 0.53 -0.06 0.43 0.56 0.35
(0.12) (0.14) (0.33) (0.10) (0.11) (0.24) (0.10) (0.12) (0.21)
ln
sh
n+g+δ 0.66 0.73 0.77 0.58 0.72 1.00 0.67 0.75 0.62
(0.07) (0.09) (0.28) (0.08) (0.08) (0.26) (0.07) (0.09) (0.23)
R2 0.78 0.78 0.35 0.75 0.78 0.50 0.74 0.74 0.47
¯ R2 0.78 0.77 0.24 0.76 0.77 0.42 0.74 0.74 0.44
s.e.e. 0.51 0.45 0.32 0.48 0.43 0.25 0.53 0.48 0.25
F-stat. 0.74 0.02 0.00 4.08 0.21 0.09 3.30 0.71 1.93
p-value 0.39 0.88 0.97 0.05 0.65 0.77 0.07 0.40 0.18
Implied α 0.31 0.29 0.14 0.23 0.24 -0.03 0.20 0.24 0.18
(0.04) (0.05) (0.15) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
Implied β 0.27 0.30 0.37 0.28 0.32 0.52 0.32 0.32 0.32
(0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
Standar errors are in parentheses.
2
5Table 2: Growth Regressions for 1960–1985: MRW speciﬁcation
PWT 4.0 (by MRW) PWT 6.0 (by BG) PWT 6.1
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 98 75 22 90 72 21 99 76 23
constant 3.02 3.71 2.76 3.04 4.04 4.09 3.23 3.52 5.47
(0.83) (0.91) (1.20) (0.78) (0.87) (1.30) (0.73) (0.85) (1.07)
lny60 -0.29 -0.37 -0.40 -0.29 -0.32 -0.43 -0.26 -0.25 -0.48
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
lnsk 0.52 0.54 0.33 0.35 0.44 0.32 0.35 0.46 0.47
(0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.06) (0.08) (0.16) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12)
lnsh 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.23
(0.06) (0.08) (0.15) (0.06) (0.07) (0.18) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12)
ln(n + g + δ) -0.51 -0.55 -0.86 -0.44 -0.30 -0.56 -0.31 -0.22 -0.33
(0.29) (0.29) (0.34) (0.28) (0.28) (0.31) (0.27) (0.29) (0.25)
R2 0.49 0.47 0.72 0.50 0.50 0.77 0.50 0.44 0.83
¯ R2 0.46 0.43 0.65 0.48 0.47 0.71 0.49 0.41 0.79
s.e.e. 0.33 0.30 0.15 0.30 0.28 0.13 0.31 0.30 0.11
Implied λ 0.0136 0.0182 0.0203 0.0134 0.0152 0.0222 0.0122 0.0116 0.0260
(0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0056) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0046)
Restricted Reg
constant 2.46 3.09 3.55 2.83 3.19 4.16 2.70 2.61 4.43
(0.47) (0.53) (0.63) (0.53) (0.61) (0.76) (0.46) (0.59) (0.56)
lny60 -0.30 -0.37 -0.40 -0.29 -0.34 -0.43 -0.28 -0.28 -0.46
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
ln sk
n+g+δ 0.50 0.51 0.40 0.34 0.41 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.39
(0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09)
ln sh
n+g+δ 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.20
(0.06) (0.08) (0.14) (0.06) (0.08) (0.17) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11)
R2 0.48 0.46 0.71 0.50 0.49 0.77 0.50 0.43 0.81
¯ R2 0.46 0.43 0.65 0.48 0.47 0.71 0.48 0.41 0.79
s.e.e. 0.33 0.30 0.15 0.30 0.29 0.13 0.31 0.30 0.11
F-stat. 0.69 0.70 0.62 0.14 1.92 0.00 0.88 2.13 1.29
p-value 0.41 0.40 0.44 0.71 0.17 0.95 0.35 0.15 0.27
Implied λ 0.0141 0.0186 0.0206 0.0138 0.00165 0.0222 0.0130 0.0130 0.0249
(0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0054) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0044)
implied α 0.48 0.44 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.34 0.40 0.48 0.37
(0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Implied β 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.21 0.19
(0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
Standar errors are in parentheses.
2
6Table 3: Level Regressions for 1960–2000, Saving Rate of Social Capital: NEWS
Y = Kα
k (AL)1−α Y = Kα
k K
β
h(AL)1−α−β Y = Kα
k Kγ





sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 98 76 23 98 76 23 98 76 23 98 76 23
constant 3.08 2.97 9.17 4.98 6.04 10.19 5.89 6.30 8.88 5.97 7.28 9.12
(1.62) (1.56) (2.56) (1.27) (1.29) (2.55) (1.29) (1.32) (2.04) (1.19) (1.19) (2.19)
lnsk 1.11 1.09 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.57 0.04 0.34 0.40 0.05
(0.12) (0.16) (0.42) (0.12) (0.14) (0.41) (0.12) (0.15) (0.38) (0.12) (0.13) (0.39)
lnsh 0.82 0.88 0.57 0.50 0.60 0.12
(0.10) (0.13) (0.37) (0.11) (0.13) (0.35)
lnss 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.19 0.22 0.31
(0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
ln(n + g + δ) -3.07 -3.14 -0.77 -2.78 -2.53 -0.84 -1.95 -1.87 -0.73 -2.20 -1.89 -0.74
(0.57) (0.54) (0.80) (0.44) (0.43) (0.77) (0.46) (0.46) (0.64) (0.43) (0.41) (0.65)
R2 0.63 0.60 0.20 0.78 0.79 0.30 0.79 0.79 0.52 0.82 0.84 0.52
¯ R2 0.62 0.64 0.12 0.78 0.78 0.18 0.78 0.78 0.44 0.81 0.83 0.41
s.e.e. 0.72 0.68 0.32 0.55 0.50 0.31 0.55 0.51 0.26 0.51 0.45 0.26
Restricted Reg
constant 8.12 8.13 9.51 8.82 8.76 9.51 8.88 8.81 9.75 9.01 8.99 9.74
(0.10) (0.13) (0.40) (0.11) (0.13) (0.39) (0.12) (0.13) (0.33) (0.11) (0.12) (0.34)
ln sk
n+g+δ 1.31 1.41 0.67 0.60 0.70 0.47 0.56 0.66 0.15 0.42 0.46 0.13
(0.11) (0.13) (0.29) (0.12) (0.14) (0.31) (0.12) (0.14) (0.27) (0.12) (0.13) (0.28)
ln sh
n+g+δ 0.86 0.96 0.55 0.50 0.63 0.15
(0.10) (0.13) (0.34) (0.12) (0.13) (0.32)
ln ss
n+g+δ 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.22 0.23 0.31
(0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10)
R2 0.59 0.60 0.20 0.76 0.78 0.29 0.77 0.77 0.51 0.81 0.83 0.52
¯ R2 0.62 0.64 0.12 0.78 0.78 0.18 0.78 0.78 0.44 0.81 0.83 0.41
s.e.e. 0.75 0.68 0.31 0.58 0.51 0.30 0.57 0.52 0.25 0.52 0.45 0.26
F-stat. 9.71 11.01 0.02 9.26 4.46 0.07 5.42 3.63 0.19 6.61 2.10 0.08
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.04 0.79 0.02 0.06 0.67 0.01 0.15 0.78
implied α 0.57 0.58 0.40 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.33 0.10 0.19 0.20 0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.05) (0.17)
Implied β 0.35 0.36 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.10
(0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.19)
Implied γ 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.10 0.09 0.19
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
Standar errors are in parentheses.
2
7Table 4: Growth Regressions for 1960–2000, Saving Rate of Social Capital: NEWS
Unconditional Convergence Y = Kα
k (AL)1−α Y = Kα
k K
β
h(AL)1−α−β Y = Kα
k Kγ





sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 98 76 23 98 76 23 98 76 23 98 76 23 98 76 23
constant -0.63 -0.00 5.06 1.09 1.24 3.39 2.51 3.16 3.98 2.93 3.34 4.34 3.30 4.50 4.56
(0.60) (0.69) (1.13) (1.06) (1.09) (2.06) (1.02) (1.18) (2.27) (1.07) (1.18) (2.30) (1.03) (1.21) (2.43)
lny60 0.15 0.08 -0.43 -0.19 -0.26 -0.46 -0.38 -0.45 -0.48 -0.38 -0.44 -0.55 -0.45 -0.55 -0.56
(0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.10) (0.15)
lnsk 0.69 0.73 0.40 0.47 0.58 0.38 0.49 0.55 0.26 0.40 0.46 0.27
(0.09) (0.12) (0.29) (0.09) (0.12) (0.29) (0.09) (0.12) (0.33) (0.09) (0.12) (0.33)
lnsh 0.42 0.43 0.18 0.29 0.34 0.11
(0.09) (0.13) (0.27) (0.10) (0.13) (0.29)
lnss 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.09
(0.04) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12)
ln(n + g + δ) -0.95 -1.16 -0.89 -1.29 -1.36 -0.91 -0.89 -0.99 -0.86 -1.15 -1.18 -0.87
(0.42) (0.43) (0.53) (0.39) (0.41) (0.54) (0.38) (0.40) (0.54) (0.38) (0.39) (0.55)
R2 0.04 0.02 0.38 0.46 0.43 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.52 0.58 0.59 0.56 0.59
¯ R2 0.03 0.00 0.35 0.44 0.41 0.49 0.54 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.57 0.53 0.46
s.e.e. 0.62 0.57 0.24 0.47 0.44 0.22 0.42 0.42 0.22 0.43 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.39 0.22
Implied λ -0.0034 -0.0020 0.0140 0.0052 0.0075 0.00153 0.0118 0.0148 0.0165 0.0119 0.0144 0.0202 0.0147 0.0202 0.0203
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0052) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0049) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0055) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0084) (0.0035) (0.0055) (0.0086)
Restricted Reg
constant 1.63 2.08 4.66 3.34 3.88 4.90 3.46 3.90 5.61 4.05 5.01 5.59
(0.52) (0.60) (0.99) (0.61) (0.78) (1.04) (0.64) (0.75) (1.43) (0.65) (0.83) (1.45)
lny60 -0.18 -0.23 -0.47 -0.35 -0.42 -0.49 -0.36 -0.42 -0.56 -0.42 -0.54 -0.56
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.15) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15)
ln sk
n+g+δ 0.71 0.77 0.54 0.50 0.61 0.47 0.50 0.58 0.40 0.42 0.48 0.38
(0.08) (0.11) (0.20) (0.09) (0.11) (0.22) (0.09) (0.11) (0.25) (0.09) (0.11) (0.26)
ln
sh
n+g+δ 0.41 0.43 0.22 0.29 0.34 0.16
(0.09) (0.13) (0.25) (0.10) (0.13) (0.27)
ln ss
n+g+δ 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.08
(0.04) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12)
R2 0.46 0.43 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.57 0.55 0.51 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.59
¯ R2 0.44 0.41 0.49 0.54 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.57 0.53 0.46
s.e.e. 0.47 0.44 0.21 0.42 0.41 0.21 0.43 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.39 0.22
F-stat. 0.33 0.86 0.49 1.03 0.67 0.21 0.39 0.40 0.50 0.86 0.34 0.29
p-value 0.56 0.36 0.49 0.31 0.42 0.64 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.36 0.56 0.60
Implied λ 0.0048 0.0066 0.0157 0.0108 0.0138 0.0170 0.0113 0.0137 0.0206 0.0138 0.0195 0.0206
(0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0049) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0054) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0084) (0.0032) (0.0052) (0.0086)
implied α 0.80 0.77 0.54 0.39 0.42 0.40 0.49 0.49 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.32
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.17) (0.07) (0.07) (0.20) (0.06) (0.07) (0.18)
Implied β 0.32 0.30 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.14
(0.06) (0.07) (0.19) (0.07) (0.07) (0.22)
Implied γ 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14)
Standar errors are in parentheses.
2
8Table 5: Level Regressions for 1960–2000, Saving Rate of Social Capital: POSTAL
Y = KαSγ(AL)1−α−γ Y = KαHβSγ(AL)1−α−β−γ
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 96 74 22 96 74 22
constant 8.11 7.14 10.79 7.82 8.30 10.75
(1.47) (1.64) (1.61) (1.27) (1.37) (1.69)
lnsk 0.44 0.47 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.23
(0.12) (0.19) (0.27) (0.12) (0.16) (0.28)
lnsh 0.58 0.74 -0.03
(0.10) (0.13) (0.26)
lnss 0.32 0.27 0.33 0.22 0.18 0.33
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
ln(n + g + δ) -1.21 -1.54 -0.18 -1.61 -1.58 -0.17
(0.53) (0.58) (0.51) (0.46) (0.48) (0.53)
R2 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.83 0.82 0.73
¯ R2 0.76 0.72 0.69 0.82 0.81 0.67
s.e.e. 0.57 0.57 0.20 0.49 0.47 0.20
Restricted Reg
Constant 9.29 9.27 9.85 9.40 9.33 9.85
(0.16) (0.22) (0.26) (0.14) (0.18) (0.27)
ln
sk
n+g+δ 0.45 0.50 0.13 0.24 0.29 0.14
(0.13) (0.19) (0.20) (0.12) (0.16) (0.21)
ln sh
n+g+δ 0.58 0.75 -0.06
(0.10) (0.12) (0.25)
ln ss
n+g+δ 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.23 0.19 0.33
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
R2 0.76 0.72 0.73 0.83 0.82 0.73
¯ R2 0.76 0.72 0.69 0.82 0.81 0.67
s.e.e. 0.57 0.57 0.19 0.49 0.47 0.20
F-stat. 0.66 1.71 0.36 1.58 0.58 0.29
p-value 0.42 0.20 0.56 0.21 0.45 0.59
Implied α 0.25 0.28 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.10
(0.06) (0.08) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14)
Implied β 0.28 0.34 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.20)
Implied γ 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.11 0.09 0.24
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Standar errors are in parentheses.
29Table 6: Growth Regressions for 1960–2000, Saving Rate of Social Capital: POSTAL
Y = KαSγ(AL)1−α−γ Y = KαHβSγ(AL)1−α−β−γ
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 96 74 22 96 74 22
constant 4.01 3.69 9.48 4.58 5.11 9.48
(1.19) (1.30) (3.44) (1.13) (1.33) (3.56)
lnY 60 -0.36 -0.36 -0.90 -0.47 -0.51 -0.90
(0.07) (0.08) (0.23) (0.08) (0.09) (0.24)
lnsk 0.43 0.45 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.25
(0.10) (0.14) (0.28) (0.10) (0.14) (0.29)
lnsh 0.33 0.38 -0.01
(0.09) (0.13) (0.28)
lnss 0.17 0.14 0.28 0.13 0.13 0.28
(0.04) (0.05) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.14)
ln(n + g + δ) -0.46 -0.58 -0.29 -0.82 -0.83 -0.29
(0.40) (0.45) (0.58) (0.39) (0.44) (0.61)
R2 0.54 0.49 0.65 0.60 0.56 0.65
¯ R2 0.52 0.47 0.57 0.58 0.53 0.55
s.e.e. 0.43 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.21
Implied λ 0.0112 0.0113 0.0577 0.0161 0.0181 0.0581
(0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0576) (0.0036) (0.0049) (0.0611)
Restricted Reg
Constant 3.69 3.66 8.57 4.71 5.03 8.61
(0.65) (0.73) (1.92) (0.67) (0.84) (2.05)
lnY 60 -0.36 -0.36 -0.87 -0.47 -0.52 -0.87
(0.07) (0.08) (0.20) (0.07) (0.09) (0.21)
ln sk
n+g+δ 0.42 0.45 0.21 0.31 0.36 0.21
(0.10) (0.14) (0.24) (0.10) (0.14) (0.24)
ln sh
n+g+δ 0.32 0.38 -0.02
(0.09) (0.13) (0.26)
ln ss
n+g+δ 0.16 0.14 0.26 0.13 0.13 0.26
(0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.04) (0.13)
R2 0.54 0.50 0.65 0.60 0.56 0.65
¯ R2 0.52 0.47 0.57 0.58 0.52 0.55
s.e.e. 0.42 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.20
F-stat. 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.09
p-value 0.76 0.98 0.75 0.89 0.94 0.76
Implied λ 0.0113 0.0113 0.0505 0.0160 0.0181 0.0512
(0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0374) (0.0035) (0.0048) (0.0409)
Implied α 0.45 0.47 0.16 0.25 0.26 0.16
(0.08) (0.10) (0.17) (0.07) (0.09) (0.18)
Implied β 0.26 0.28 -0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.22)
Implied γ 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.11 0.09 0.20
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Standar errors are in parentheses.
30Table 7: Growth Regressions for 1960–2000, Stock of the Social Capital (ks): Trust/SOCDEV
ks: Trust, the latest data Trust, the earliest data SOCDEV
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int.
# of obs 51 48 23 51 48 23 56 48
constant 3.18 4.99 3.86 3.69 5.71 4.23 3.90 4.61
(1.28) (1.22) (2.29) (1.30) (1.21) (2.50) (1.58) (1.95)
lny60 -0.53 -0.57 -0.42 -0.53 -0.57 -0.52 -0.63 -0.67
(0.09) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) (0.17) (0.11) 0.14
lnsk 0.44 0.72 0.50 0.45 0.74 0.34 0.26 0.33
(0.12) (0.13) (0.33) (0.11) (0.13) (0.33) (0.10) (0.14)
lnsh 0.57 0.65 0.33 0.53 0.62 0.08 0.32 0.40
(0.14) (0.13) (0.33) (0.14) (0.13) (0.46) (0.13) (0.15)
lnks 0.02 0.06 -0.14 -1.50 -1.18 -0.86 0.26 0.26
(0.09) (0.08) (0.17) (0.43) (0.38) (0.58) (0.11) (0.14)
ln(n + g + δ) -1.69 -1.41 -0.89 0.11 0.16 0.08 -1.24 -1.24
(0.43) (0.38) (0.55) (0.10) (0.08) (0.28) (0.51) (0.57)
R2 0.58 0.70 0.59 0.59 0.72 0.57 0.61 0.60
¯ R2 0.54 0.66 0.47 0.55 0.69 0.45 0.57 0.55
s.e.e. 0.34 0.30 0.22 0.34 0.29 0.22 0.36 0.37
Implied λ 0.0189 0.0210 0.0138
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0059)
Restricted Reg
Constant 4.74 5.09 3.99 4.91 5.30 5.03 5.59 5.98
(0.78) (0.71) (1.42) (0.77) (0.69) (1.92) (0.92) (1.19)
lny60 -0.50 -0.57 -0.42 -0.50 -0.57 -0.50 -0.63 -0.68
(0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.17) (0.11) (0.14)
ln sk
n+g+δ 0.51 0.73 0.51 0.50 0.71 0.47 0.28 0.34
(0.11) (0.11) (0.22) (0.11) (0.11) (0.23) (0.10) (0.14)
ln
sh
n+g+δ 0.58 0.65 0.34 0.53 0.61 0.19 0.34 0.42
(0.14) (0.13) (0.29) (0.14) (0.12) (0.40) (0.13) (0.15)
lnks 0.06 0.06 -0.14 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.26 0.28
(0.09) (0.07) (0.15) (0.09) (0.08) (0.25) (0.11) (0.14)
R2 0.56 0.70 0.59 0.58 0.72 0.57 0.59 0.59
¯ R2 0.54 0.66 0.47 0.55 0.69 0.45 0.57 0.55
s.e.e. 0.34 0.29 0.21 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.36 0.36
F-stat. 2.33 0.01 0.01 1.36 0.17 0.27 1.72 0.78
p-value 0.13 0.92 0.94 0.25 0.68 0.61 0.20 0.38
Implied λ 0.0173 0.0209 0.0138 0.0110 0.0137 0.0164 0.0116 0.0131
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0057) (0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0085) (0.0042) (0.050)
Implied α 0.32 0.37 0.40 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.22 0.24
(0.06) (0.05) (0.16) (0.06) (0.05) (0.19) (0.08) (0.09)
Implied β 0.36 0.33 0.27 0.35 0.32 0.17 0.27 0.29
(0.06) (0.05) (0.18) (0.06) (0.05) (0.30) (0.08) (0.08)
implied γ 0.04 0.03 -0.11 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.21 0.19
(0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.04) (0.22) (0.11) (0.10)
Standar errors are in parentheses. SOCDEV does not take log.
To calculate structural parameters, ﬁrst three columns are imposed model in equation (9). Remaining columns are
imposed equation (10).
31Table 8: Growth Regressions for 1960–2000, Non-linear Least Squares Estimation
Non-linear Least Squares
Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs. 98 76 23
constant 3.24 4.41 4.50
(0.99) (1.22) (2.19)
φ1 -0.45 -0.55 -0.56
(0.07) (0.10) (0.14)
φ2 0.40 0.46 0.27
(0.11) (0.13) (0.31)
φ3 0.29 0.34 0.11
(0.10) (0.17) (0.48)
φ4 -1.10 -1.11 -0.83
(0.35) (0.37) (0.40)
φ5 0.10 0.14 0.09
(0.03) (0.05) (0.09)
φ6 (= δs + g) 0.12 0.12 0.11
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SSR 15.63 10.91 0.84
s.e.e. 0.41 0.40 0.23
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenteses.
The model is equation (12).
Table 9: Median of Aggregate Returns to Social, Physical, and Human Capitals (%)
Sample
Type of capital Non-Oil Int. OECD
Social (NEWS) 9.77 2.03 -7.60
Physical 9.15 9.22 9.41
Human 24.60 26.93 15.06
Calculation based on equation (13).
32Table 10: Eﬃcient GMM estimators, Level Regressions
Sample number 78 75 38 37 38 37 38 38 38
ss NEWS POSTAL NEWS POSTAL NEWS POSTAL NEWS NEWS NEWS
instruments
baseline† yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cook’s WWII yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
sk yes yes yes yes yes
sh yes yes
ss yes
n + g + δ yes
coeﬃcients
(White SEs)
constant 9.49 9.54 8.78 10.16 8.98 10.13 9.02 9.19 9.02
(0.21) (0.50) (0.38) (0.17) (0.21) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20) (0.15)
ln
sk
n+g+δ -0.08 -0.14 0.75 -0.31 0.53 -0.28 0.47 0.30 0.48
(0.25) (0.33) (0.47) (0.15) (0.24) (0.13) (0.19) (0.22) (0.15)
ln sh
n+g+δ 1.30 1.80 -0.19 0.62 0.48 0.61 0.59 1.11 0.58
(0.67) (0.88) (1.01) (0.22) (0.40) (0.21) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
ln ss
n+g+δ 0.18 0.02 0.42 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.11 0.25
(0.22) (0.29) (0.24) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Test Statistics
(p-values)
Hansen’s J 2.17 1.55 2.49 7.41 9.51 7.40 9.51 14.05 9.50
(0.53) (0.67) (0.96) (0.49) (0.39) (0.60) (0.48) (0.17) (0.58)
Wald for Restriction 0.00 0.05 1.25 2.45 0.00 2.45 0.00 1.22 0.01
(0.97) (0.82) (0.26) (0.12) (0.95) (0.12) (0.98) (0.27) (0.94)
Implied Coeﬃcients
(White SEs)
α -0.03 -0.05 0.38 -0.20 0.24 -0.18 0.21 0.12 0.21
(0.22) (0.25) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07)
β 0.54 0.67 -0.10 0.39 0.21 0.38 0.26 0.44 0.25
(0.13) (0.11) (0.65) (0.08) (0.17) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
γ 0.08 0.01 0.21 0.18 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.04 0.11
(0.24) (0.32) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
†: All estmations include following baseline instruments: constant, log of are (square km), per worker GDP in 1960, Barro-Lee index in 1960, sk in 1960, price of investment goods
in 1960, price of consumption goods in 1960.
3
3Table 11: Eﬃcient GMM Estimators, Growth Regressions
Sample number 78 75 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
ss NEWS POSTAL NEWS POSTAL NEWS POSTAL NEWS NEWS NEWS
instruments
baseline† yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cook’s WWII yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
sk yes yes yes yes yes
sh yes yes
ss yes
n + g + δ yes
coeﬃcients
(White SEs)
constant 5.90 7.91 5.79 9.02 5.47 9.15 5.79 5.37 6.40
(2.29) (3.37) (2.50) (1.04) (1.20) (1.04) (0.94) (0.88) (0.92)
lny60 -0.60 -0.80 -0.67 -0.88 -0.61 -0.90 -0.64 -0.60 -0.71
(0.24) (0.39) (0.28) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
ln
sk
n+g+δ 0.09 -0.16 0.85 -0.21 0.69 -0.18 0.50 0.61 0.56
(0.36) (0.31) (0.38) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18)
ln sh
n+g+δ 0.19 1.22 -0.21 0.50 0.01 0.48 0.54 0.40 0.54
(1.23) (1.29) (0.80) (0.21) (0.38) (0.21) (0.26) (0.31) (0.24)
ln ss
n+g+δ 0.33 0.11 0.23 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.10 0.09 0.11
(0.33) (0.26) (0.24) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Test Statistics
(p-values)
Hansen’s J 0.32 2.16 2.28 7.88 7.41 8.76 10.20 10.42 10.86
(0.85) (0.34) (0.94) (0.34) (0.49) (0.36) (0.33) (0.32) (0.37)
Wald for Restriction 0.31 0.02 0.77 1.18 0.37 1.98 0.38 0.38 2.42
(0.58) (0.90) (0.38) (0.28) (0.54) (0.16) (0.54) (0.54) (0.12)
Implied Coeﬃcients
(White SEs)
α 0.07 -0.08 0.55 -0.15 0.46 -0.12 0.28 0.36 0.29
(0.37) (0.46) (0.16) (0.18) (0.09) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10)
β 0.16 0.62 -0.14 0.35 0.01 0.33 0.31 0.24 0.28
(0.91) (0.16) (0.72) (0.08) (0.30) (0.09) (0.12) (0.17) (0.11)
γ 0.27 0.05 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.06
(0.37) (0.53) (0.19) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
λ 0.0232 0.0402 0.0274 0.0538 0.0237 0.0580 0.0253 0.0228 0.0309
(0.0151) (0.0489) (0.0208) (0.0213) (0.0084) (0.0248) (0.0069) (0.0057) (0.0083)
Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
†: All estmations include following baseline instruments: constant, log of are (square km), per worker GDP in 1960, Barro-Lee index in 1960, sk in 1960, price of investment goods
in 1960, price of consumption goods in 1960.
3
4Table 12: Quad-Capital Production Function
speciﬁcation Level Growth
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 95.00 74.00 22.00 95.00 74.00 22.00
Constant 8.04 8.55 10.49 4.92 5.72 9.58
(1.22) (1.28) (1.80) (1.13) (1.32) (3.66)
lny60 -0.50 -0.58 -0.93
(0.08) (0.10) (0.25)
lnsk 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.27 0.32 0.19
(0.12) (0.15) (0.31) (0.10) (0.14) (0.33)
lnsh 0.40 0.56 -0.06 0.25 0.33 -0.04
(0.11) (0.13) (0.28) (0.10) (0.13) (0.29)
ln NEWS 0.14 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12)
ln POSTAL 0.18 0.12 0.30 0.12 0.10 0.27
(0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15)
ln(n + g + delta) -1.41 -1.38 -0.22 -0.74 -0.82 -0.30
(0.45) (0.45) (0.55) (0.39) (0.439 (0.63)
R2 0.85 0.85 0.74 0.62 0.59 0.66
¯ R2 0.84 0.83 0.65 0.59 0.55 0.52
s.e.e. 0.47 0.43 0.21 0.40 0.39 0.21
Restricted
Constant 9.42 9.31 9.87 4.99 5.64 8.97
(0.13) (0.17) (0.27) (0.69) (0.86) (2.22)
lny60 -0.50 -0.59 -0.91
(0.08) (0.10) (0.23)
ln sk
n+g+δ 0.19 0.25 0.10 0.27 0.32 0.16
(0.12) (0.15) (0.24) (0.10) (0.13) (0.27)
ln
sh
n+g+δ 0.39 0.57 -0.09 0.25 0.33 -0.05
(0.11) (0.13) (0.26) (0.10) (0.13) (0.28)
ln NEWS
n+g+δ 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.11)
ln POSTAL
n+g+δ 0.19 0.13 0.30 0.12 0.10 0.26
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.13)
R2 0.84 0.85 0.73 0.62 0.59 0.66
¯ R2 0.84 0.83 0.65 0.59 0.55 0.52
s.e.e. 0.47 0.43 0.20 0.39 0.39 0.20
F-stat. 1.29 0.36 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.05
p-value 0.26 0.55 0.73 0.94 0.93 0.83
implied λ 0.0174 0.0220 0.0595
(0.0039) (0.0057) (0.0617)
share of K 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.22 0.22 0.12
(0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.09) (0.20)
share of H 0.21 0.27 -0.06 0.20 0.23 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.21) (0.07) (0.07) (0.23)
share of NEWS 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
share of POSTAL 0.10 0.06 0.22 0.10 0.07 0.20
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Standard errors are in parentheses
35Table 13: Level Regressions for 1960–2000, Saving Rate of Social Capital: Groups
PWT 6.1 (1960-2000) (Group) (O-Group) (P-Group)
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Sample OECD Sample OECD Sample OECD Sample OECD
# of obs 99 76 23 33 20 33 20 33 20 33 20
constant 4.98 6.04 10.19 5.52 12.03 5.68 11.32 5.60 11.59 5.72 12.29
(1.26) (1.29) (2.55) (1.59) (1.64) (1.64) (1.27) (1.58) (1.86) (1.62) (1.82)
lnsk 0.48 0.59 0.54 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.30 0.25 0.37 0.24 0.50
(0.12) (0.14) (0.41) (0.16) (0.26) (0.16) (0.20) (0.16) (0.29) (0.17) (0.30)
lnsh 0.82 0.88 0.57 1.03 1.27 1.05 0.62 1.06 1.22 1.07 1.31
(0.10) (0.13) (0.37) (0.14) (0.27) (0.14) (0.28) (0.14) (0.30) (0.14) (0.30)
lnss 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.03 0.06 -0.02
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
ln(n + g + δ) -2.78 -2.53 -0.84 -2.70 -0.71 -2.70 -0.55 -2.75 -0.80 -2.70 -0.65
(0.44) (0.43) (0.77) (0.50) (0.48) (0.51) (0.37) (0.50) (0.52) (0.50) (0.52)
R2 0.78 0.79 0.30 0.89 0.70 0.89 0.84 0.89 0.70 0.89 0.70
¯ R2 0.78 0.78 0.18 0.87 0.64 0.87 0.79 0.87 0.62 0.87 0.62
s.e.e. 0.55 0.50 0.31 0.36 0.19 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.20 0.36 0.20
Restricted Reg
constant 8.82 8.76 9.51 9.10 9.55 9.09 9.90 9.13 9.65 9.17 9.58
(0.11) (0.13) (0.39) (0.16) (0.26) (0.16) (0.21) (0.16) (0.27) (0.18) (0.29)
ln
sk
n+g+δ 0.59 0.70 0.47 0.45 0.22 0.43 0.16 0.42 0.17 0.39 0.21
(0.12) (0.14) (0.31) (0.15) (0.22) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.16) (0.23)
ln
sh
n+g+δ 0.86 0.96 0.55 1.15 1.12 1.17 0.49 1.18 1.08 1.19 1.11
(0.10) (0.13) (0.34) (0.13) (0.26) (0.14) (0.26) (0.13) (0.26) (0.14) (0.27)
ln ss
n+g+δ 0.09 0.24 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.02
(0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06)
R2 0.76 0.78 0.29 0.86 0.66 0.87 0.82 0.87 0.68 0.87 0.66
¯ R2 0.78 0.78 0.18 0.87 0.64 0.87 0.79 0.87 0.62 0.87 0.62
s.e.e. 0.58 0.51 0.30 0.38 0.20 0.38 0.15 0.38 0.20 0.38 0.20
F-stat. 9.35 4.46 0.07 5.12 2.33 4.34 1.31 5.00 1.12 4.54 2.26
p-value 0.00 0.04 0.79 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.27 0.03 0.31 0.04 0.15
Implied α 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.09
(0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.13)
Implied β 0.35 0.36 0.27 0.44 0.48 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.48
(0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.05) (0.09) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07)
Implied γ 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01
(0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Standar errors are in parentheses.
3
6Table 14: Growth Regressions for 1960–2000, Saving Rate of Social Capital: Groups
PWT 6.1 (1960–2000) Rstricted sample (Group) (O-Group) (P-Group)
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Sample OECD sample Sample OECD sample Sample OECD sample Sample OECD sample
# of obs 99 76 23 33 20 33 20 33 20 33 20
constant 2.55 3.16 3.98 2.07 7.54 1.93 8.10 2.20 7.24 2.19 7.79
(1.01) (1.18) (2.27) (1.43) (1.39) (1.52) (1.65) (1.46) (1.49) (1.49) (1.48)
lny60 -0.39 -0.45 -0.48 -0.56 -0.63 -0.55 -0.69 -0.57 -0.63 -0.57 -0.63
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
lnsk 0.47 0.58 0.38 0.18 0.32 0.18 0.31 0.17 0.27 0.17 0.37
(0.09) (0.12) (0.29) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.17) (0.12) (0.19) (0.13) (0.19)
lnsh 0.42 0.43 0.18 0.64 0.89 0.63 0.79 0.66 0.85 0.66 0.93
(0.09) (0.13) (0.27) (0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.25) (0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.20)
lnss -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
ln(n + g + δ) -1.31 -1.36 -0.91 -2.10 -0.70 -0.21 -0.66 -2.14 -0.77 -2.11 -0.64
(0.39) (0.41) (0.54) (0.41) (0.31) (0.41) (0.32) (0.42) (0.33) (0.41) (0.32)
R2 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.70 0.85 0.70 0.85 0.70 0.85 0.70 0.85
¯ R2 0.54 0.48 0.48 0.66 0.81 0.65 0.80 0.65 0.80 0.65 0.80
s.e.e. 0.42 0.42 0.22 0.27 0.12 0.28 0.12 0.28 0.12 0.28 0.12
Implied λ 0.0122 0.0148 0.0165 0.0207 0.0250 0.0202 0.0294 0.0213 0.0252 0.0209 0.0250
(0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0097) (0.0058) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0052)
Restricted Reg
constant 3.41 3.88 4.90 5.26 6.09 5.30 6.79 5.39 6.26 5.38 6.09
(0.60) (0.78) (1.04) (0.90) (0.67) (0.94) (1.18) (0.93) (0.68) (0.93) (0.71)
lny60 -0.36 -0.42 -0.49 -0.55 -0.61 -0.55 -0.68 -0.56 -0.62 -0.56 -0.61
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08)
ln
sk
n+g+δ 0.50 0.61 0.47 0.34 0.21 0.34 0.19 0.33 0.17 0.31 0.21
(0.09) (0.11) (0.22) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)
ln
sh
n+g+δ 0.41 0.43 0.22 0.74 0.80 0.74 0.06 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.80
(0.09) (0.13) (0.25) (0.14) (0.18) (0.15) (0.23) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18)
ln ss
n+g+δ 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04)
R2 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.62 0.83 0.62 0.84 0.63 0.85 0.63 0.83
¯ R2 0.54 0.48 0.48 0.66 0.81 0.65 0.80 0.65 0.80 0.64 0.80
s.e.e. 0.42 0.41 0.21 0.30 0.12 0.31 0.13 0.31 0.12 0.31 0.13
F-stat. 1.13 0.67 0.21 7.33 1.42 7.18 1.25 7.09 0.55 6.77 1.68
p-value 0.29 0.42 0.64 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.47 0.01 0.22
Implied λ 0.0111 0.0138 0.0170 0.0199 0.0237 0.0202 0.0285 0.0207 0.0245 0.0205 0.0237
(0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0054) (0.0058) (0.0047) (0.0061) (0.0094) (0.0062) (0.0049) (0.0061) (0.0049)
implied α 0.39 0.42 0.40 0.21 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.13
(0.07) (0.08) (0.17) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12)
Implied β 0.32 0.30 0.18 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.49 0.46 0.50
(0.06) (0.07) (0.19) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Implied γ 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.00
(0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Standar errors are in parentheses.
3
7Table 15: First Diﬀerence Regressions for the Level Regression, Saving Rate for Social Capital: NEWS
Y = Kα(AL)1−α Y = KαHβ(AL)1−α−β Y = KαSγ(AL)1−α−γ Y = KαHβSγ(AL)1−α−β−γ
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 95 76 23 95 76 23 95 76 23 95 76 23
lnsk 0.20 0.28 -0.37 0.22 0.40 0.08 0.20 0.27 -0.43 0.22 0.40 0.02
(0.10) (0.13) (0.48) (0.09) (0.13) (0.35) (0.10) (0.13) (0.49) (0.09) (0.13) (0.35)
lnsh 0.15 0.20 0.98 0.15 0.21 0.98
(0.05) (0.06) (0.21) (0.05) (0.06) (0.21)
lnss 0.11 0.10 -0.54 0.06 -0.02 -0.49
(0.10) (0.15) (0.57) (0.09) (0.15) (0.40)
ln(n + g + δ) -1.76 -1.88 -2.47 -2.18 -2.06 -2.02 -1.83 -1.91 -2.28 -2.21 -2.06 -1.85
(0.47) (0.54) (1.16) (0.47) (0.51) (0.82) (0.47) (0.54) (1.18) (0.47) (0.52) (0.82)
s.e.e. 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.28 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.35 0.28
Restricted Reg
ln sk
n+g+δ 0.27 0.37 -0.05 0.29 0.50 0.21 0.27 0.36 -0.05 0.29 0.49 0.21
(0.10) (0.13) (0.51) (0.10) (0.13) (0.33) (0.10) (0.13) (0.53) (0.10) (0.13) (0.33)
ln
sh
n+g+δ 0.12 0.22 1.07 0.11 0.21 1.09
(0.05) (0.06) (0.19) (0.05) (0.07) (0.19)
ln ss
n+g+δ 0.12 0.19 -0.03 0.09 0.05 -0.31
(0.10) (0.16) (0.60) (0.10) (0.16) (0.38)
s.e.e. 0.40 0.38 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.28 0.40 0.38 0.45 0.39 0.36 0.28
F-stat. 10.54 8.20 5.68 14.96 7.63 1.06 10.17 7.08 6.52 14.36 7.42 1.92
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.32 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.18
Implied α 0.21 0.27 -0.06 0.21 0.29 0.09 0.19 0.23 -0.06 0.19 0.28 0.10
(0.06) (0.07) (0.57) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07) (0.61) (0.05) (0.05) (0.16)
Implied β 0.08 0.13 0.47 0.07 0.12 0.55
(0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Implied γ 0.09 0.12 -0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.16
(0.07) (0.09) (0.68) (0.07) (0.09) (0.24)
Standar errors are in parentheses.
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8Table 16: First Diﬀerence Regressions for the Growth Regression, Saving Rate for Social Capital: NEWS
Y = Kα(AL)1−α Y = KαHβ(AL)1−α−β Y = KαSγ(AL)1−α−γ Y = KαHβSγ(AL)1−α−β−γ
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 95 76 23 95 76 23 95 76 23 95 76 23
lny60 -0.64 -0.61 -0.41 -0.59 -0.53 -0.53 -0.62 -0.58 -0.2 -0.56 -0.51 -0.53
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.14) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14)
lnsk 0.28 0.42 0.44 0.29 0.39 0.41 0.29 0.44 0.38 0.29 0.41 0.35
(0.08) (0.10) (0.30) (0.08) (0.10) (0.30) (0.08) (0.10) (0.30) (0.08) (0.10) (0.30)
lnsh -0.07 -0.10 0.28 -0.07 -0.09 0.27
(0.06) (0.07) (0.27) (0.06) (0.07) (0.26)
lnss -0.08 -0.18 -0.48 -0.09 -0.17 -0.48
(0.09) (0.13) (0.32) (0.09) (0.13) (0.32)
ln(n + g + δ) -1.31 -0.98 -0.01 -1.06 -0.73 -0.36 -1.23 -0.88 0.15 -0.94 -0.65 -0.20
(0.40) (0.44) (0.76) (0.46) (0.48) (0.83) (0.41) (0.44) (0.75) (0.47) (0.48) (0.81)
s.e.e. 0.32 0.28 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.22 0.32 0.28 0.22
Implied λ 0.0255 0.0233 0.0134 0.0220 0.0191 0.0188 0.0242 0.0217 0.0135 0.0204 0.0180 0.0188
(0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0075) (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0072)
Restricted Reg
lny60 -0.61 -0.58 -0.44 -0.53 -0.51 -0.55 -0.59 -0.56 -0.42 -0.50 -0.48 -0.53
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12)
ln
sk
n+g+δ 0.33 0.46 0.37 0.32 0.41 0.36 0.33 0.48 0.37 0.33 0.43 0.36
(0.08) (0.10) (0.27) (0.08) (0.10) (0.27) (0.08) (0.10) (0.26) (0.08) (0.10) (0.26)
ln
sh
n+g+δ -0.11 -0.11 0.29 -0.12 -0.11 0.27
(0.06) (0.07) (0.26) (0.06) (0.07) (0.25)
ln ss
n+g+δ -0.08 -0.16 -0.49 -0.10 -0.16 -0.47
(0.09) (0.13) (0.30) (0.09) (0.12) (0.29)
s.e.e. 0.33 0.29 0.22 0.32 0.28 0.22 0.33 0.28 0.22 0.32 0.28 0.22
F-stat. 6.32 1.49 0.26 3.60 0.87 0.15 6.22 1.86 0.00 3.36 1.17 0.00
p-value 0.01 0.23 0.62 0.06 0.35 0.70 0.01 0.18 0.97 0.07 0.28 0.95
Implied λ 0.0236 0.0220 0.0145 0.0188 0.0177 0.0201 0.0224 0.0204 0.0136 0.0173 0.0166 0.0044
(0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0069) (0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.9479)
Implied α 0.35 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.51 0.30 0.40 0.55 1.23 0.54 0.66 0.53
(0.06) (0.06) (0.19) (0.09) (0.09) (0.19) (0.09) (0.12) (1.29) (0.08) (0.08) (0.41)
Implied β -0.15 -0.13 0.24 -0.19 -0.16 0.40
(0.10) (0.11) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.40)
Implied γ -0.10 -0.19 -1.62 -0.16 -0.24 -0.70
(0.12) (0.17) (2.96) (0.20) (0.28) (0.78)
Standar errors are in parentheses.
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9Table 17: Robustness Check
Level with Dummies Level in RWLS Growth with Dummies Growth in RWLS
sample Non-Oil Int. OECD Non-Oil Int. OECD Non-Oil Int. OECD Non-Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 98 76 23 95 71 17 98 76 23 91 72 13
# of outliers n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 5 6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 7 4 10
constant 8.99 9.80 9.12 9.06 8.75 7.58 3.82 4.38 4.56 3.87 3.11 9.16
(1.29) (1.29) (1.89) (1.29) (0.96) (0.73) (1.36) (1.88) (2.18) (1.01) (1.13) (0.21)
lny60 -0.42 -0.47 -0.56 -0.45 -0.38 -0.80
(0.07) (0.13) (0.14) (0.07) (0.10) (0.01)
lnsk 0.22 0.29 0.05 0.14 0.58 -1.49 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.19 0.44 0.39
(0.12) (0.14) (0.36) (0.10) (0.15) (0.19) (0.10) (0.12) (0.30) (0.08) (0.10) (0.02)
lnsh 0.40 0.55 0.12 0.48 0.52 -0.82 0.25 0.24 0.11 0.26 -0.07 0.37
(0.15) (0.18) (0.54) (0.13) (0.18) (0.12) (0.10) (0.20) (0.48) (0.09) (0.16) (0.06)
lnss 0.13 0.17 0.31 0.11 0.16 0.41 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.06
(0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
ln(n + g + δ) -0.70 -0.64 -0.74 -0.65 -1.26 0.18 -0.71 -0.65 -0.87 -0.63 -0.64 -0.30
(0.53) (0.53) (0.63) (0.53) (0.34) (0.21) (0.42) (0.43) (0.40) (0.35) (0.36) (0.07)
Sub-Sahara Africa -0.23 -0.09 -0.18 0.12 -0.22 -0.24 -0.39 -0.42
(0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21) (0.16) (0.25) (0.11) (0.15)
Latin America 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.01 -0.11
(0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12)
East Asia 0.39 0.29 0.20 0.10 0.50 0.46 0.40 0.44
(0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16)
OECD 0.90 0.75 1.01 0.40 0.27 0.29 0.51 0.22
(0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.17) (0.21) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19)
R2 0.85 0.86 0.52 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.66 0.64 0.59 0.75 0.74 1.00
¯ R2 0.84 0.84 0.41 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.62 0.59 0.46 0.72 0.70 0.99
s.e.e. 0.47 0.42 0.26 0.43 0.37 0.09 0.38 0.37 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.02
implied λ 0.0139 0.0157 0.0206 0.0150 0.0119 0.0382
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0011)
Rest. P-value 0.92 0.52 0.78 0.88 0.99 0.00 0.82 0.97 0.60 0.66 0.64 0.00
implied α 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.26 4.88 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.21 0.52 0.24
(0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.07) (0.06) (7.34) (0.09) (0.10) (0.21) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
implied β 0.23 0.27 0.10 0.28 0.23 3.45 0.25 0.21 0.14 0.28 -0.07 0.15
(0.07) (0.07) (0.30) (0.06) (0.07) (6.92) (0.09) (0.13) (0.37) (0.07) (0.25) (0.06)
implied γ 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.06 0.07 -1.87 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (8.34) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03)
α, β and γ are calculated using restricted regressions. White standard errors are in parentheses.
Outlier countries appear in next table.
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0Table 18: Robustness Check, List of Outlier Countries
sample Outlier Countries
Non-Oil, Level Dem. Rep. Congo, Hong Kong, Singapore
Int., Level Guyana, Jamaica, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
OECD, Level New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom
Non-Oil, Growth Botswana, Dem. Rep. Congo, Hong Kong, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Peru, Singapore
Int., Growth Botswana, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Zambia
OECD, Growth Canada, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Spain, Turkey, United States
Table 19: Level Regressions for 1960–2000, Dependent Variables: Level of GDP per capita
ss NEWS POSTAL
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 98 76 23 96 74 22
constant 5.41 6.77 8.88 7.37 7.82 10.46
(1.25) (1.24) (2.24) (1.34) (1.43) (1.73)
lnsk 0.37 0.45 0.10 0.25 0.32 0.26
(0.12) (0.14) (0.39) (0.13) (0.17) (0.28)
lnsh 0.56 0.67 0.14 0.65 0.81 -0.02
(0.15) (0.14) (0.35) (0.11) (0.13) (0.27)
lnss 0.21 0.23 0.30 0.23 0.19 0.33
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
n + g + δ -2.33 -2.01 -0.72 -1.71 -1.70 -0.15
(0.45) (0.42) (0.66) (0.49) (0.50) (0.54)
R2 0.83 0.85 0.50 0.84 0.83 0.72
¯ R2 0.82 0.84 0.39 0.83 0.82 0.70
s.e.e. 0.54 0.47 0.27 0.52 0.49 0.21
Restricted Reg
Constant 8.50 8.47 9.31 8.91 8.82 9.43
0.12 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.19 0.28
ln
sk
n+g+δ 0.45 0.51 0.15 0.26 0.33 0.16
(0.12) (0.14) (0.29) (0.13) (0.17) (0.22)
ln sh
n+g+δ 0.56 0.70 0.16 0.65 0.83 -0.06
(0.13) (0.13) (0.33) (0.11) (0.13) (0.26)
ln ss
n+g+δ 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.20 0.33
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
R2 0.82 0.84 0.50 0.84 0.83 0.71
¯ R2 0.82 0.84 0.39 0.83 0.82 0.70
s.e.e. 0.55 0.47 0.26 0.52 0.49 0.20
F-stat. 6.21 1.91 0.04 1.34 0.51 0.37
p-value 0.01 0.17 0.85 0.25 0.48 0.55
Implied α 0.20 0.21 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.11
(0.05) (0.05) (0.17) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14)
Implied β 0.25 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.35 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.19) (0.04) (0.04) (0.20)
implied γ 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.08 0.23
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
41Table 20: Growth Regressions for 1960–2000, Dependent Variables: Growth of GDP per capita
ss NEWS POSTAL
sample Non Oil Int. OECD Non Oil Int. OECD
# of obs 98 76 23 96 74 22
constant 3.77 4.86 5.13 5.03 5.50 9.21
(1.05) (1.18) (2.28) (1.15) (1.32) (3.20)
lny60 -0.44 -0.56 -0.56 -0.46 -0.52 -0.89
(0.08) (0.10) (0.15) (0.08) (0.15) (0.24)
lnsk 0.42 0.50 0.29 0.33 0.40 0.28
(0.10) (0.13) (0.34) (0.11) (0.15) (0.29)
lnsh 0.36 0.42 0.18 0.40 0.47 0.02
(0.11) (0.13) (0.30) (0.10) (0.13) (0.29)
lnss 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.27
(0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.15)
ln(n + g + δ) -0.98 -1.10 -0.67 -0.65 -0.74 -0.24
(0.42) (0.43) (0.56) (0.43) (0.48) (0.59)
R2 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.55 0.63
¯ R2 0.59 0.53 0.43 0.59 0.52 0.51
s.e.e. 0.44 0.41 0.23 0.43 0.42 0.21
Implied λ 0.0143 0.0205 0.0204 0.0155 0.0183 0.0547
0.0036 0.0057 0.0086 0.0037 0.0051 0.0528
Restricted Reg
Constant 3.94 4.91 5.44 4.53 4.95 8.16
0.61 0.77 1.33 0.65 0.80 1.99
lny60 -0.43 -0.56 -0.56 -0.47 -0.53 -0.86
(0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.22)
ln
sk
n+g+δ 0.43 0.50 0.33 0.32 0.40 0.21
(0.10) (0.12) (0.25) (0.10) (0.15) (0.24)
ln
sh
n+g+δ 0.35 0.42 0.19 0.41 0.47 0.00
(0.11) (0.13) (0.27) (0.09) (0.13) (0.28)
ln ss
n+g+δ 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.12 0.25
(0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.14)
R2 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.55 0.62
¯ R2 0.59 0.53 0.43 0.59 0.52 0.51
s.e.e. 0.44 0.41 0.22 0.43 0.42 0.21
F-stat. 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.28 0.18
p-value 0.84 0.95 0.87 0.61 0.60 0.68
Implied λ 0.0140 0.0204 0.0204 0.0161 0.0191 0.0488
(0.0033) (0.0053) (0.0084) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0388)
Implied α 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.26 0.16
(0.06) (0.07) (0.18) (0.07) (0.09) (0.17)
Implied β 0.27 0.26 0.17 0.30 0.31 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.22) (0.05) (0.06) (0.22)
implied γ 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.19
(0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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